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ABSTRACT 
 
Pervasive usage of video surveillance is rapidly increasing in developed countries. Continuous security 
threats to public safety demand use of such systems. Contemporary video surveillance systems offer 
advanced functionalities which threaten the privacy of those recorded in the video. There is a need to 
balance the usage of video surveillance against its negative impact on privacy. This chapter aims to 
highlight the privacy issues in video surveillance and provides a model to help identify the privacy 
requirements in a video surveillance system. The authors make a step in the direction of investigating the 
existing legal infrastructure for ensuring privacy in video surveillance and suggest guidelines in order to 
help those who want to deploy video surveillance while least compromising the privacy of people and 
complying with legal infrastructure.  
Keywords: Video Monitoring, Privacy, Information Security, Legislation, Data Protection, Data 
Retention, Storage, Encryption 
INTRODUCTION 
Use of video surveillance, both by public authorities and the private sector, is spreading fast amid the 
increasing demand to build infrastructure to protect against harm to people or property. This development 
has been further accelerated by the decreasing cost of the hardware (Cavallaro, 2007) and the ubiquity 
of relatively cheap communication infrastructure. Video surveillance is considered a valuable tool to 
protect people and property from harm. Law enforcement agencies worldwide rely on closed circuit TV 
(CCTV) systems to help prevent, detect and investigate attacks against public safety. It is also used to 
detect and investigate attacks against property, e.g. vandalism. The private sector also uses CCTV to 
protect public safety in the private sphere mostly to protect against intrusions, theft and vandalism. Video 
surveillance is particularly attractive because it allows people in one location to supervise activities in 
other locations. This means that law enforcement community can extend the reach of the police forces by 
having police officers in one location survey the activities of several locations and alert rapid mobile 
police officers when imminent crime is suspected or detected. This increases the presence of the police 
force in the community or it allows the same quality of policing with a smaller police force. As the costs 
of hardware and communication infrastructure has come down, whereas the costs of police officers 
training management and pays have generally increased, so considerable savings can be achieved through 
a model with video surveillance and a rapid reaction force. Similar arguments hold for the private sector, 
where cost reduction and the possibility of outsourcing security services to external companies are 
important factors in the rapid uptake of video surveillance technologies. As a consequence of these trends, 
in many developed countries, surveillance cameras are now frequently found in office buildings, shopping 
malls, housing estates, streets, squares, parks, busses, trains, stations, airports and many other public 
places, as well as in an increasing number of private companies and homes. 
 
 The pervasive use of video cameras in public places captures the activities of people and allows officials 
to see the daily activities of a target individual. Such pervasive surveillance may impact negatively on the 
democratic rights of people to freely express their thoughts and to associate freely to share those thoughts.  
People might not feel comfortable  to express their  views or to take part  in protests  against  the 
government policies if they  know that they  might be identified  for such activity  later  on. Moreover, the 
output of these surveillance systems may also be abused for other nefarious purposes, such as stalking 
individuals or used by paparazzi to learn the whereabouts of celebrities.   
 
Contemporary video surveillance systems utilize advanced techniques, such as object-identification and 
object-tracking, which allows tracking of an individual spanning over multiple cameras distributed 
throughout a larger area, e.g. an entire city (Moncrieff, Venkatesh, & West, 2009). Compared to 
contemporary video surveillance solutions, traditional CCTV systems are simple recording systems that 
have to be constantly monitored by human observers without automated technological assistance. Yet 
there have been reported incidents, in traditional video surveillance, where the operators were involved in 
unauthorized collection of data on the activities of individuals. For instance, in a report by BBC News 
(2005), a group of council employees in the UK spied on a woman’s apartment using surveillance 
cameras installed in that area. Possibilities for such misuse are further increased with the advent of 
contemporary video surveillance systems that facilitate rapid data retrieval enabled by searching and 
advanced imaging technology. Such advanced technology in pervasive video surveillance may enable 
linking the activities of a target individual across multiple video streams. 
 
As criminals and terrorists increasingly make use of new technology to mount attacks on public safety 
and cause incidents like 9/11 and the Madrid and London bombings, the public and law enforcement 
agencies must continuously increase their technological capabilities to protect innocent individuals. 
However, the need for increased security does not mean that privacy has any less importance. Privacy 
advocates and civil libertarians consider video surveillance a serious threat to the privacy of non-criminals 
who may be captured by cameras in public places several times a day (Kumagai & Cherry, 2004; Solove, 
2002) . Employment of video surveillance systems in public areas might cause deterrence, not only for 
criminals and terrorists, but also for individuals who want to raise concerns against government policies 
or simply meet with friends or beloved ones without being observed. Regardless of these privacy threats, 
the importance of video surveillance systems in combating the security threats is considered very 
important (Buttarelli, 2010), so surveillance systems must be designed and used in ways that protect 
individuals against crime, without compromising their democratic rights to privacy and freedom against 
technological measures. 
 
In order to increase the public acceptance of video surveillance systems, it is important that they obey the 
law of the territory where they are installed and that their deployment strikes a balance between security 
and the need to protect privacy. The aim of this chapter is to identify the privacy issues and the legal 
requirements associated with video surveillance systems. The chapter is organized as follows: in the next 
section, we provide an overview of surveillance and its different types focusing particularly on video 
surveillance. In Section 3, we identify threats to privacy posed by video surveillance systems and classify 
the legislation that may apply on video surveillance systems. Section 4 presents a model to help identify 
privacy requirements. We also provide a taxonomy of video surveillance and suggest a list of guidelines 
provided by several public and private bodies worldwide, to serve as recommendations for organizations 
planning to install video surveillance systems while protecting privacy of recorded people and avoiding 
breaking the law. 
 
 
 BACKGROUND  
Surveillance 
Surveillance is the act of watching the activities of people, with or without the consent of the people being 
watched, typically for management or security reasons.  The technological development has ensured 
reduced hardware costs and increased levels of automation, so governments and law enforcement 
agencies worldwide consider surveillance a cost-effective method for fighting serious threats to public 
safety.  
 
Surveillance is increasingly used in developed countries and the majority of people are unaware of the 
magnitude of its occurrence in the form of our images recoded by surveillance cameras in public places, 
interception of our communication over the internet, or our voices recoded during phone conversations 
(O’Donnell, 2010). There are several forms of surveillance and a significant amount of work in 
surveillance has been carried out through biometrics (Lyon, 2008) and ‘dataveillance’ such as 
communication monitoring (Marx & Muschert, 2007). Several sociologists have discussed the reasons 
motivating the high level of surveillance experienced in modern societies along-with its implications. 
Surveillance is viewed as a key tool of social classification, power and disciplinary control in the modern 
state (Maguire, 1998). The term Panopticon is often used to indicate the ultimate power offered by 
massive surveillance (Foucault, 1977; Wood, 2003). The term Panopticon is originally coined by the 
English philosopher and social theorist Jeremy Bentham in the late 18th century to describe a type of 
building where a single watchman can observe all people from a central location (Drapper, 2002; Semple, 
1993). The Panopticon was promoted as the ideal architecture for a prison, because the fact that prisoners 
cannot know when they are being watched means that they always have to act as if they are currently 
under surveillance, thus  effectively controlling their own behavior at all times (this is called an ‘unequal 
gaze’ by Foucault). The concept of a Panopticon is discussed in detail by Foucault, who observes that the 
discipline imposed by the Panopticon is ideal for creating ‘docile bodies’ that comply with the rules of a 
modern industrial society, i.e. bodies that function in factories, military regiments, and school classrooms. 
The ‘unequal gaze’ achieved through the Panopticon causes the internalization of disciplinary 
individuality, and creates the docile body required of the prisoners. This means one is less likely to break 
rules or laws if they believe they are being watched, even if they are not. The concept of ‘discipline’ has 
been further advanced towards ‘control’ where surveillance systems are used to methodically control 
what people can or cannot do (Stalder, 2002; Zureik, 2007).  
 
Surveillance systems can be categorized many ways, but we primarily distinguish between two major 
types of surveillance systems based on the means using which they are conducted:  i) Electronic 
Surveillance and ii) Non-electronic Surveillance.  The former includes computer surveillance, telephone 
tapping, video surveillance, workplace surveillance and mobile phone surveillance.  Non-electronic 
surveillance, on the  other  hand,  does not  involve digital  technology  but  makes  use of human-beings 
such as appointing human operatives on a target and  intercepting postal  messages.  The benefit of 
electronic surveillance is that it facilitates automation, e.g. by computers, so that mass surveillance can be 
achieved with relatively few human resources. As we have mentioned earlier, the costs of surveillance 
technology (hardware and network connectivity) are decreasing, so human resources have become the 
most costly component of a surveillance system. The automation of surveillance systems therefore allows 
more people to be monitored at equal costs or an overall reduction of costs in the surveillance system. 
Another important advantage of reducing the number of humans actively involved in a surveillance 
system is a significant reduction of insider threats, from abuse of power as mentioned earlier. Therefore, 
the advent of digital technology has significantly reduced the use of non-electronic surveillance. 
 
 It should be noted that although the term ‘surveillance’ will be used extensively throughout this chapter, 
our particular focus is on video surveillance. We do, however, give a brief overview of computer 
surveillance and workplace surveillance before we focus on video surveillance and its related issues. 
 
Computer Surveillance 
Computer surveillance is the act of monitoring the computer activity, data stored in the computer and the 
data transmitted over the network. Computer surveillance techniques that focus on the activities and data 
stored on individual computers are typically referred to as host-based techniques, while techniques that 
primarily monitor the data transmissions and traffic flows on the network are known as network-based 
techniques. Regardless of the techniques that are being used, computer surveillance can be either 
voluntary and participatory, such as the use of cookies by web-browsers, or involuntary and even 
surreptitious, such as the use of device fingerprinting techniques (Nikiforakis et al., 2013; Yen, Xie, Yu, 
Yu, & Abadi, 2012) or the extensive amounts of log data that have been stored by European network 
providers since the introduction of the European Data Retention Directive (The European Parliament and 
the Council of the European Union, 2006). 
 
Host-based surveillance techniques normally require software to be installed on the individual host. This 
software typically monitors activities, e.g. running processes and subsystems, and/or data on the system, 
e.g. important system files, such as the content of configuration files, system and application log-files, or 
important data files created by the users. As with the network-based techniques, this software may be 
installed either by the users or system administrators for explicit monitoring purposes, as is the case with 
anti-virus software, spam-filtering systems, spy-ware detection systems and other systems installed to 
detect or prevent the presence of malicious software (aka. malware) on the host computer, or by the 
different forms of malware mentioned above. Monitoring system activities, such as running processes and 
sub-systems, normally tells the monitor if the system is performing as expected. This has security 
applications as exemplified by the monitoring systems mentioned above, but monitors are more often 
installed to ensure that the performance of applications and sub-systems conform to the service level 
agreement (SLA) or to predict possible future bottlenecks based on observed trends in the system usage 
patterns. Malware normally monitors system activities to determine what kind of malware detection 
systems are present and if possible try to disable them. Monitoring system configuration files and the 
different log-files created by sub-systems and applications provides complete situational awareness 
aggregated from correlating notable events registered by each sub-system or application. This is often 
used to detect evidence of hostile reconnaissance, which often precedes an attack as part of an Advanced 
Persistent Threat (APT) or a malware infection, but it is more commonly used to debug sub-systems or 
applications that do not perform as intended. Malware monitors system files to detect and remove 
evidence of their own presence and it monitors user data files to identify valuable assets, such as trade 
secrets, credit card information, passwords for other systems, etc. and transfers this information back to 
its operator through the Internet. Some information stored on the computers may be public in nature, but 
should still be restricted to a limited set of authorized users. This is particularly true for online social 
media, such as Facebook, Linked-In, Instagram and Snapchat, which can be analyzed to extract 
information about a person’s interests, associations, beliefs, plans and activities (Albrechtslund, 2008). 
 
Network-based computer surveillance requires access to the communication infrastructure at some point 
between the two communicating parties. For example the Communication Assistance for Law 
Enforcement Act in the United States, authorizes the law enforcement agencies to tap phone 
conversations and to intercept internet traffic including reading of emails. This act requires the Internet 
Service Providers to install sniffing technology allowing law enforcement agencies to monitor the internet 
traffic. As the network traffic is passing beyond the control of the two end-points, unencrypted 
communication can be eavesdropped upon, and possibly altered, without the knowledge of the 
 communicating parties. Unencrypted communication, such as standard email and web browsing activities, 
can be screened for interesting content, typically by programs that look for specific words or phrases, but 
even if the communication is encrypted, the monitor can still learn who is talking to whom, as well as the 
time, frequency and extent of the communication, so that human examiners can be alerted for further 
investigations. The use of such surveillance techniques by the intelligence community have recently 
received much attention after the revelations of Edward Snowden, a former employee of Booz Allen 
Hamilton contracted to work for the National Security Agency (NSA). Edward Snowden has leaked 
documents that shows that the NSA is collaborating with a number of U.S. federal agencies and foreign 
intelligence agencies to filter Internet traffic passing through these countries (BBC News, 2013; The 
Guardian, 2013). The implications of such mass surveillance of Internet communication is similar to the 
effects of video surveillance in public places that we mentioned above, i.e. people are likely to apply self-
censorship and refrain from expressing opinions and views that may be considered “dangerous” by the 
intelligence services. As the work of the intelligence services is necessarily secret, self-censoring citizens 
must leave a wide margin of error, which severely limits the expression of free speech through the 
Internet. As with contemporary video surveillance, this mass surveillance capability stems from the 
automation made possible by computers. 
 
The brief discussion of online social media above highlight a problem with the increasing reliance on 
cloud services, i.e. computing services provided by external organizations. Many of these services are 
provided free of charge, or at a very low cost, which entitles the service provider to impose their own 
conditions on the use of their services. The world’s leading search engine, Google, stores search phrases 
along with identifying information including IP address in a database for up to 9 months (Toubiana & 
Nissenbaum, 2011). Such identifying information is later partially anonymized by removing the last octet 
of IP address and is retained for at least further 9 months (CNet, 2008). This allows Google to deliver 
targeted advertisements relevant to the individual in the context of the search. Moreover, Google’s 
privacy policy states that Google scans the contents of emails exchanged over its email service, Gmail, 
collects information about their users’ internet surfing habits and modifies cookies on their users’ 
computers. This information is primarily collected by Google to profile their users and make their online 
marketing more effective, but U.S. law enforcement agencies publicly admit to using such data collected 
from such organizations in order to strengthen the profile of an individual under surveillance. It is 
common to find laws that authorize security agencies to monitor activities of their people over the 
internet, in other  parts of the world such as the European Data Retention Directive (The European 
Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2006).  
Workplace Surveillance 
Frequent usage of internet and email at work and sophisticated computer technology allow the employers 
to regularly monitor the actions of their employees, e.g. many corporate firewalls block access to social 
networks or certain websites, so that employees do not waste time on private activities while they are at 
work. Moreover, activity logs from enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems, customer relationship 
management (CRM) systems or Bespoke Case Management Systems (BCMS) provide management with 
an accurate record of what, where and when their employees work. While these activity logs are typically 
required to comply with corporate governance legislation, they may also be abused to closely monitor the 
activities of employees in the workplace. Employers are continuously increasing the monitoring spanning 
from monitoring of email, web surfing to tapping of office phones to enhance the productivity of the 
organization. This has become so prevalent that the U.S. government has published a brief discussion of 
what practices are legal (Beesley, 2012). In many companies where employees are often working away 
from their main office, it is common to install GPS tracking in the company car, so that the employee can 
easily call for road side assistance in case of a malfunction and the employer can help track deliveries or 
recover vehicles that have been stolen. While there are obvious benefits to GPS tracking for both 
employer and employee, it is also possible to abuse the tracking to measure the performance of their 
 employees, e.g. for a travelling salesman it is possible to correlate the average length of their visit to a 
potential customer with the size of their sales to that particular customer thus calculating the efficiency of 
the salesman. Such secondary use of data, i.e. use of data for a purpose different from the one for which it 
was collected, is generally not allowed, but it is difficult to prevent or detect. According  to  a survey  
conducted by American Management Association (2007),  more  than 75% of US organizations monitor  
email messages, internet usage, phone calls and computer files of their employees.  More than 25% of the 
fired workers were dismissed for misusing of email while around 33% have been fired for misuse of the 
Internet. Misuses include violation of company policy, inappropriate content and excessive personal use. 
There  are many  genuine  reasons  for organizations to know what  is happening within  the  organization, 
however,  the  employer  is expected  to remain  aware  of the  employee’s right to privacy.  In most  
countries , privacy or data protection legislation, at  a minimum,  requires  that employers  obtain  consent 
from the  employees by stating how the  organization is monitoring them,  what  information  is being 
collected,  the  purpose  of the information collection  and who may review the information. Compliance 
with this legislation generally also prevents the employer from secondary use as mentioned above. Close 
monitoring by management may either be seen as a welcome interest in the employees’ wellbeing, but it 
is more often interpreted by employees as a sign of distrust by management, which typically has a 
negative impact on employee morale. Excessive monitoring will typically not reduce the speed of work, 
which is easily monitored, but the quality of work, which is often more difficult and costly to monitor, 
may suffer from the lack of motivation among employees.  
Video Surveillance 
As stated earlier, this chapter focuses particularly on video surveillance systems, also known as CCTV, its 
impact on privacy and the relevant legislation in a representative selection of developed countries with  
respect  to privacy. These countries have been selected because video surveillance is widely available in 
these countries. Video surveillance  is a system  that employs, normally,  a network  of cameras  to 
monitor  a particular area (public  or private) for protection  against  theft,  violence, terrorism  or other 
similar issues. A simple system would allow a watchman to observe  what  is going on in an area  under 
surveillance  while a sophisticated one may include thousands of cameras  linked together making  use of 
state-of-art technology  to  automatically identify  and track  a particular person from one location  to 
another (Moncrieff et al., 2009).  
 
As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, the potential benefits of CCTV especially with respect to 
security are seen as a cost effective mechanism to fight severe threats to public safety.  People are 
monitored in public areas like train stations, buses, stores and ATMs sometimes without even being 
noticed.   There  exist  more  than 4 million  cameras  in UK alone (Norris, McCahill, & Wood, 2004) 
- thanks to technological advances  in manufacturing, communication and storage  capabilities. According 
to a report from BBC News (2002), it is estimated that an average person in London is caught on camera 
around  300 times a day. The technology that facilitates the collection of information also poses a great 
risk of misusing or abusing of the surveillance data, for instance in a report by BBC News (2005) few 
council workers used CCTV cameras to spy on a woman. In another incident reported by The Guardian 
(2010), an airport worker at Heathrow Airport was given a police warning for harassment after he 
allegedly took a photo of a female colleague as she went through a full-body scanner at Heathrow airport.  
For this reason, massive usage of CCTV in public places is of great concern for civil libertarians and is 
seen as a threat to privacy by critics (Kumagai & Cherry, 2004), not only for the risk of abuse, but also 
for the risk of self-censorship in expression and behavior as mentioned earlier.  
 
Existing legislations to protect the privacy of citizens in the context of lawful video surveillance vary 
greatly among different countries with respect to the different aspects of video surveillance that are being 
regulated. For example, there are different rules for limiting the storage time of recorded  images, the 
need for notification signs in the surveillance  area and the possible requirement of a court  warrant in 
 order to perform surveillance on a particular person.  In Section 3, we shall categorize the relevant 
legislations and provide a summary of legislation, in  this  regard,   for selected countries as mentioned 
above. 
 
Capabilities of Video Surveillance Systems 
Contemporary video surveillance systems that cover most of the public areas are often linked through a 
communication network.   The  pervasive  form  of video  surveillance systems  combined   with  the  
technological advances  such  as  high  resolution, magnification, identification and  tracking have  the  
potential to  disrupt the balance  between  the need for such systems  and the privacy  of individuals  
(Beech et al., 2006). 
 
In contrast to the early age and many currently used CCTV cameras, which can only see as far as a human  
eye, modern cameras can pan and tilt and can provide a lot more detailed  image than  previously  
possible.  A camera  having  60-times optical  zoom lens can  read  what  is written on a cigarette pack  at  
100 yards (Slobogin, 2 0 0 2 ) .  Furthermore, in a report by New York Times (2004), 400-times  
magnification cameras  have  been  deployed  in Chicago. Improved  quality  of recordings, reduced 
storage  costs and use of digital  technology  enable  traversing and  exploitation of recorded  data  in 
ways previously  impossible  with  analog recordings.  For example metadata information including date,  
time,  location  and  information about objects  in the  recordings  make  it easier to search  for a particular 
person or activity and  may lead to profiling of individuals  (Solove, 2002). 
 
Although facial recognition and  other  remote  biometric systems  are yet in their  infancy,  there  is a 
significant investment in this  area  and  the  reliability of the identification  process is improving (Beech 
et al., 2006). Advancements in this area can be integrated with CCTV systems to track movement in their 
field of view or across networked cameras allowing an operator to automatically follow a target object in 
an entire city in real time or in stored data (Moncrieff et al., 2009). This means that people can be tracked 
in real time and with little effort, which makes cyber stalking extremely easy for anyone with access to 
the surveillance system, regardless of whether this access is authorized or not. People participating in 
political rallies can be followed to their home address as the meeting dissolves and any people visiting 
celebrities or political dissidents can be followed on camera by paparazzi or law enforcement agents in 
oppressive regimes.  
 
In  contrast,  there   also  exist  technologies   that can  minimize  the  above-mentioned invasive  effects  
of video  surveillance systems  on  privacy. Digital masking can automatically hide the faces, license 
plates and other identifying areas in the images of non-targeted people while storing the recorded data 
(e.g., Chinomi, Nitta, Ito, & Babaguchi, 2008; Senior et al., 2005). Another example of such technology 
is Google Street View which blurs the license plates of cars and the faces of people in the images. In 
order to protect unauthorized access to the data, the stored data can also be encrypted, so that only to the 
individuals who have the relevant decryption key can access the video stream (e.g., Carrillo, Kalva, & 
Magliveras, 2008; Frederic & Ebrahimi, 2008). Encrypting the video streams in the camera with a key 
that is only known by authorized users means that the video data is protected from interception both in 
transit between the camera and the video storage system and when it is stored in that system. If the 
authorized user loses the decryption key, however, the entire database of video data becomes illegible, 
which is sometimes addressed through some mechanism based on key-escrow or threshold cryptography. 
Use of watermarking or logging could also be helpful to track when and where data was accessed, 
although it cannot prevent access to the recorded data. A digital watermarking scheme embeds a visible 
but imperceptible watermark in the video stream that identifies either the sender, i.e. the camera, or the 
intended recipient of the video stream. This means that if the video stream is ever leaked, it will be 
possible to identify the source of that leak. Watermarking has been extensively studied as part of digital 
rights management (DRM) systems used by the motion picture industry, but few, if any, systems have 
 proven to be robust against different types of attacks to remove, overwrite or simply embed a lot of extra 
watermarks into the video stream thus providing plausible deniability to the person who leaks the data.  
 
PRIVACY & LEGISLATION 
Social, legal and technological issues surrounding video  surveillance are  multifaceted.   The  previous  
section  discussed  the  capabilities of advanced video surveillance systems  that can allow automatic 
information extraction and  exploiting  the  system  for biometric identification and  tracking of 
individuals. In this  section,  we discuss  and  try  to cover privacy  expectations, the  democratic values at 
stake  and the legislation  relevant to video surveillance  systems. 
 
Though there does not exist a universal definition of privacy, it is often described as how far society can 
intrude into personal affairs of an individual.  A well-known definition of privacy given by Alan Westin 
(1967), author of “Privacy and Freedom”, is: “the desire of people to choose freely under what 
circumstances and to what extent they will expose themselves, their attitude and their behavior to others” 
(p. 7). In many privacy theories it is considered an individual right. For example Thomas Emerson (1970) 
states that privacy is “based upon premises of individualism, that the society exists to promote the worth 
and the dignity of the individual. . . . The right of privacy . . . is essentially the right not to participate in 
the collective life—the right to shut out the community” (p. 545). Critique to such privacy definitions also 
exist which argue that privacy is an individual right that should trump social interests. For instance, 
Amitai Etzioni (2008) contends that privacy is “a societal license that exempts a category of acts 
(including thoughts and emotions) from communal, public, and governmental scrutiny” (p. 196). 
 
The boundary between what we reveal and what we do not and control over that boundary, are among the  
most  important attributes of civilization (Nagel, 2002). Many people don’t feel comfortable in exposing 
their behaviors to strangers even if they don’t fear disapproval or hostility by the society.  In a similar  
context, another point which  is frequently debated is, when  you are  in a public  space such as in a mall 
or a street, every step  you take  may be watched  by someone anyway so what difference does it make 
whether  you are watched  by a person or a camera.  The fundamental difference is symmetry.  When you 
are being watched by a person  you can watch  them  back  however,  when  you are being  watched but  
cannot watch  them  back  forms an asymmetrical relationship. Consider a one-sided mirror between an 
employee and employer’s room to understand the situation.  Thus  the heart of the  debate is not  the  fact  
that whatever you  do may be watched  by someone rather  the opposite that  there  may be a particular 
person who is watching everything  you do, facilitated by the automated large-scale video surveillance  
without much effort and cost (Margalit, 2008). 
 
Advent of technology with its capacity to collect and analyze information about individuals increased 
interest in the right of privacy.   Presently, most of the countries in the world recognize the right of 
privacy in their legislation. The provisions mostly include rights of sacredness of the home and  secrecy 
of communication, at  the least.  In some countries,  for example the United  States, where the  right of 
privacy  is not  explicitly  mentioned in the  constitution, the courts  have ruled inferring  this right from 
other  provisions. 
 
Threats to Privacy 
The current and  potential capabilities of video surveillance systems  are quite attractive for law 
enforcement officials worldwide and they see video surveillance as an  effective mechanism to  fight 
against security threats.  Critics,  however, argue that being pervasive  in nature video surveillance  poses 
a threat to many democratic  rights of the non-criminals and it might force the law-abiding people to  
change  their  daily  routines in order  to  avoid  being  caught by the  camera. Few privacy awareness 
 initiatives like Isee project  in Manhattan (Institute for Applied Autonomy, 2005) and Observing 
Surveillance Project in Washigton (Observing Surveillance, 2002)  identified  locations  of CCTV  
cameras  to help people avoid being captured by the cameras. 
 
There are certain constitutionally protected values which are at stake because of extensive video 
surveillance.  First such right at stake is the right of anonymity which is closely related to privacy.  Many 
people expect to remain anonymous in public  places  such  as entering an  infertility clinic or a 
psychiatrist’s office. The presence of video cameras in public places would capture all such activities and 
would allow the officials to see daily activities of any individual. Secondly, the democratic right of people 
to freely express their thoughts and to associate freely to share those thoughts is in danger.  People might 
not feel comfortable  to express their  views or to take part  in protests  against  the government policies if 
they  knew they  might be identified  for this activity  later  on. Another potential problem of video 
surveillance system is its discriminatory use by the officials against a particular individual or community 
based on the ethnic, racial, gender or religious grounds. For instance, Norris & Armstrong (1999a) found 
in their study about CCTV surveillance in the UK that black people are twice as likely to be a target of 
surveillance as compared to white people and similarly men are three times more likely to be surveilled 
than women, not because of their involvement in crime or disorder but simply based on categorical 
suspicion. 
 
Nothing to  Hide, Nothing to  Worry About 
 
A typical argument that is often presented in discussions about privacy issues is: “If you have got nothing 
to hide, you have got nothing to worry about” (Margalit, 2008, p. 425). A similar argument was presented 
as a slogan by the British government in a campaign to support video surveillance (Rosen, 2005). 
Frequently encountering such an argument in news interviews and discussions, Daniel Solove (2007, pp. 
749-750) states that he decided to ask the readers of his blog to provide their opinions in response to this 
argument. Some interesting comments he received in response include:  
 
 This  is not about hiding  something, this  is about  it being none of other people’s business 
 I am doing nothing wrong and  don’t need to justify  my position.  If you need to investigate my 
activities, get a warrant to do so 
 I don’t have anything  to hide, but I don’t have anything  I feel like showing you, either 
 
The  reasoning  of the  argument nothing to  hide  depends  on the  fact  that privacy  is violated  only if 
something illegal or embarrassing is revealed  about an individual. Hence the majority of people not 
involved in such activities has nothing to worry.  Rephrasing  the argument in a generic manner that "all 
law-abiding  citizens should have nothing  to hide" reveals that nothing to hide argument is misleading 
and is based on a wrong assumption  that  privacy is about  hiding  wrong-doings.  Concealment of bad  
things  is just  one aspect  of privacy  among many  other  aspects  like lack of transparency and 
accountability and  usage  of collected  data  for purposes  other  than the  informed  ones.  The nothing to 
hide argument attempts to hide the existence of a problem altogether (Solove, 2011). 
 
Incidents 
A potential threat in video surveillance systems is voyeurism – exploitation of video surveillance system 
by the authorized personnel for targeted collection  of data  on activities or behaviors  of an individual 
(Norris & Armstrong, 1999b). According to a report by BBC News(2005) a few council workers in 
Liverpool spied on a woman’s apartment using a modern pan-tilt-zoom CCTV street camera. Such misuse 
can be extended to spy on government officials or celebrities.  For example, in another incident which 
 started a whole new debate about  use of CCTV,  a security  guard used a museum’s CCTV camera to spy 
on the German  Chancellor  Angela Merkel’s private  apartment (Cavallaro, 2007).  
 
Despite posing a threat to privacy  and dangers  of its misuse by the officials, the  usefulness  of CCTV  
systems cannot be denied.   What is mainly  needed  is that these systems must  be designed in ways that 
not only protect privacy  and freedom while protecting the people against  security  threats but  they must  
also be able  to  prevent or detect any  abusive  usages  by using  techniques such  as logging, encryption 
and authorization control mechanisms. 
Classification of Relevant Legislation 
The legislation regarding CCTV varies significantly in Europe as well as the rest of the world (Privacy 
International, 2007).  Some countries, e.g., Canada and Italy, have made regulations regarding usage of 
CCTV by private and public  authorities; others  such as France and China have  regulations but they 
apply mainly to private systems, while some countries, for example India, have  no particular laws in this  
regard.  CCTV  is primarily criticized  as a threat to privacy  and  hence it is mainly  regulated in the  
context of privacy  and  data  protection. There  could be several  provisions related  to CCTV  including  
privacy  protection, criminal  proceedings,  federal & state  laws and  retention period  which need to be 
consulted for employment of CCTV  system  in a particular country. Below we classify legislation 
regarding video surveillance into different categories,  in order to serve as a reference point to investigate  
what  relevant provisions are to be considered  before deploying or for maintaining CCTV  systems  in a 
particular region of the world. 
 
Privacy and  Data Protection 
Most  of the  countries recognize  the  right to  privacy.    In  some  countries,  for example the United  
States,  where right of privacy is not recognized explicitly in the  constitution there  exist  court rulings  
which recognize  this  right implicitly linking it with other provisions in the constitution. Regulations 
regarding privacy are particularly important in cases where specific regulations on video surveillance are 
missing in legislation of a country. 
 
Communication Interception 
Some countries such as Canada and Denmark have made regulations over communication interception, 
even by  public  or  law  enforcement authorities, and  require  a  court order  before intercepting the 
communication of an individual  under  surveillance.  This court order is usually valid for a limited 
duration, few days to few months, and the court may renew it depending  upon the  matter, for example  
in criminal  proceedings which could lead to prison  of more than two years,  for which an individual is 
being  surveilled.  This  type of legislation  is also particularly relevant if no or limited  legislation  exists 
regarding  video surveillance. 
 
Exemption for Public Authorities 
In some cases where the system is to be operated  by the public or law enforcement authorities, there  
might exist exemptions in the  legislation.  These  exemptions may  allow the  authorities to  perform  
communication interception or operate video surveillance systems to keep an eye over the activities  of 
the general public or a specific target without any restrictions. For example, in France Police is allowed to 
remotely access and collect information held on IT systems.  
 
Federal & State Laws 
In countries such as the United States that consist  of autonomous states/provinces, one needs to consult 
federal  as well as state regulations in the  context of video  surveillance.  For example, few Canadian  
 provinces have strict  regulations  and guidelines prepared by the  provincial  privacy  commissioners  that 
are to be followed by the  private organizations who wish to deploy video surveillance systems in publicly 
accessible areas such as shopping  malls and super markets.  
 
Regulatory Body 
Many countries have a regulatory  body (also called regulator,  privacy commissioner or data  protection  
authority) to keep oversight of data  protection  practices being followed by the  organizations that need to 
process  personal  data  of any  form whether  images captured through  video surveillance  systems or 
other  data  such as  medical  and  biometric data.   In  such  countries, legislation  might  require 
registering  and/or obtaining prior  permission  from regulator before employing CCTV  system  operated 
by public  or private authorities.  In Spain, for example,  the regulator  requires an efficacy study  of the 
system against  alternative methods to justify  a video surveillance  system. 
 
Video Surveillance 
The  legislation  of a country may  include  laws that apply  explicitly  to  video surveillance systems.  
The  laws  could  be  related to  overt video  surveillance systems  or  could  cover  covert  systems  as  
well which  are  normally   used  by security agencies  or detectives in an investigation.  Depending upon  
the  video surveillance system to be deployed, one needs to consult the legislation carefully whether  the 
laws apply to public authorities, private  bodies or both.  Countries such as Canada and the Netherlands 
which have explicit  regulations regarding  video surveillance  often also include clauses about  
followings: 
 
Notification: The  requirement that the  CCTV  system  controller must  notify the public about  the 
surveillance  by displaying  meaningful  symbols. 
 
Workplace Surveillance: There  might exist laws that refrain  or restrict the usage of 
video surveillance systems  over workplace  to monitor employee performance.  
 
Retention Period: The  maximum time-limit for which the  personal  data  or images could 
be stored. 
 
Privacy Safeguards: The  requirements regarding masking,   logging,  access control and 
auditing  mechanism  that  limit access to the surveillance  data. 
 
Public Access to  their Data: The  law often  requires  that there  must  exist mechanism to 
allow people to access their images in a reasonable timeframe. 
Legislation in Selected Countries 
In this  section,  we summarize the  legislation  of Canada, the United States and other selected countries 
in Europe  (Banisar & Davies, 1999; Privacy   International, 2007, 2010) regarding privacy  in video 
surveillance systems  in the  light of classification of relevant legislation, described  in the  previous  
section.  We choose these countries because of two reasons. First, video surveillance is widely available 
in these countries. Secondly, there is sufficient information available regarding their regulations in 
English language, from reliable sources. This summary is not supposed to be exhaustive and  the  law of a 
country may  include  further requirements that are to be followed by the organizations who perform  
video surveillance. But it serves to provide a general idea. 
 
Canada 
 
1 No  explicit right of privacy in Charter  of Rights and Freedoms, although it 
 outlines  protection from unreasonable search and seizure which is often 
considered  to be applicable  on informational privacy too 
2 Communication interception requires  court order  
3 The federal Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documentation Act 
(PIPEDA) also applies to video surveillance 
4 Regulatory body does exist and  has provided  certain  guidelines  both  for covert 
and overt video surveillance performed by public and private  sector 
5 It is obligatory  to inform public about  video surveillance  via signs 
6 The signage should include the purpose  of collection of video surveillance and 
the organization’s privacy  contact person 
7 Video data  should be kept only as long as necessary and must be destroyed when 
no more required 
 
Denmark 
 
1 The right of privacy  is recognized in the constitution 
2 Communication interception requires  court  order  and  the  frequency  of requests  
and approval  is quite  high 
3 It is obligatory  to inform public about  video surveillance  via signs 
4 In 2007, act  on TV surveillance was amended enabling  private sector  to perform  
video  surveillance on their  property which  was  previously  not allowed 
5 There exists a regulatory  body, however, informing the regulator  or taking approval  
is not required  before installing  video surveillance  systems 
6 It is obligatory  to inform public about  video surveillance  via signs 
7 Retention period  for video data  is not  clearly  stated, however,  retention period for 
other  personal  information is 12 months 
 
France 
 
1 Privacy right  is not  explicitly  mentioned in the  constitution but  has been ruled to be 
implicit 
2 Police is allowed to remotely access, record, collect and transfer information held on 
IT systems 
3 Anti-terror act of 2006 authorizes private  parties to install CCTV on places open to 
public and likely to be exposed to risks of aggression or theft 
4 Regulatory body exists and authorization from regulatory body is required before 
installing CCTV systems . However,  it has  limited  powers  over  activities of 
government  
 5 It is obligatory  to inform public about  video surveillance  via signs 
6 Retention period  for video data  is not  clearly  stated, however,  retention period for 
other  personal  information is 12 months 
 
Italy 
 
1 No explicit protection  of privacy in the constitution, though  protections for 
communication and home are there 
2 Pre-emptive communication interception may  occur at  the  discretion of Attorney 
General 
3 Strong  regulatory authority exists 
4 Video surveillance in public places is permitted only if it is proportionate to the 
pursuing  objectives and should only be activated when other measures are inadequate 
5 It is obligatory  to inform public about  video surveillance  via signage 
6 Storage  of images should be limited  in time 
 
Netherlands 
 
1 The right of privacy  is recognized in the constitution 
2 Communication interception requires  court order 
3 Video surveillance in public places requires informing the regulator  in advance 
4 It is obligatory  to inform public about  video surveillance  via signs 
5 Video data  could be retained for upto  four weeks 
 
Norway 
 
1 Constitution does not include a specific privacy  clause 
2 Communication interception requires  judicial  warrant, however,  bugging 
conversations of criminals  by police is relaxed 
3 Regulator operates  under  ministry of Government Administration but  is generally  
considered  independent 
4 There is no requirement to inform regulatory  body in case of non-recorded video 
surveillance. However, for  recorded  video  surveillance, the  regulatory body  has  to  
be informed which has the power to prohibit video surveillance 
5 It is obligatory  to inform public about  video surveillance  via signs 
6 No data  retention law exists 
  
Spain 
 
1 The right of privacy  is recognized in the constitution 
2 Communication interception does not required  court  order 
3 Video surveillance can only be used when other proportionate methods are not 
available 
4 Video surveillance has to be reported  to regulator  who will assess its justification 
5 It is obligatory  to inform public about  video surveillance  via signs 
6 Video data  has to be removed  after  one month 
 
United Kingdom 
 
1 No constitutional right of privacy 
2 Communication interception does not require court order rather  ministerial approval  is enough 
3 Surveillance can be done by Police, local authorities or private  sector.  
4 Regulator has been granted greater  powers and fining capacities 
5 It is obligatory  to inform public about  video surveillance  via signs 
6 Video data  could be retained for two years 
7 Although  CCTV  code of practices  exist but  they  have no legal binding 
 
United States 
 
1 No right to privacy  in constitution, though court  has  ruled  linking  it with other  
provisions 
2 Data Privacy Act  protects records  held  by  public  authorities, but  no 
comprehensive  data  protection law for private  sector  exists 
3 Federal  Trade  Commission  issued self-regulating privacy  guidelines,  however, it 
has no authority to enforce privacy  rights 
4 No federal law regarding video surveillance  exists. Video surveillance  laws in 
different states  vary,  for example,  in New York  video surveillance can only be 
conducted by the  police while in Arizona  one can use video surveillance at  a public  
place without posting  a notice to inform public 
5 No data  retention law exists 
MODEL & TAXONOMY OF VIDEO SURVEILLANCE 
In this section, we attempt to formulate a model from our study of cases, issues and legal requirements. 
We present a model and taxonomy of video surveillance as a method to facilitate identifying the privacy 
 requirements and problem areas in a video surveillance system.  We start with a discussion of model and 
discuss taxonomy later in this section.  
 
The model in Figure 1 presents an abstract model of video surveillance as a method to identify the privacy 
requirements in a video surveillance system. Fundamentally, a video surveillance system must include 
elements to capture video, to store/record video and to display video to the users, as well as a mechanism 
to transport video data between these elements. Figure 1(a) shows the main elements of our model, which 
includes four components, namely: video capture, -transport, -monitoring, and -storage. The video capture 
component includes the cameras, their local infrastructure, and the area which can be captured by the 
cameras. Once the data is captured, it needs to be securely transported; this is typically done over the 
internet, so we have included this as a component in our model. The  monitoring component includes the 
different elements that are necessary to allow somebody to watch the video. The monitoring  component 
must consider  all  security and privacy  concerns that  arise when the captured data (live or stored) is 
watched by the observers. Finally, the storage component is responsible for securely storing the data and 
restricting the access of stored data to the authorized individuals only.  
 
 
Figure  1: Video Surveillance  Model 
 
 
The four components identified in Figure 1(a), allow us to identify the scope for the privacy requirements 
that may arise in video surveillance systems. We do, however, also need to consider the different 
stakeholders and interests in order to identify such requirements. There are two principal stakeholders in a 
video surveillance systems, the owner, who commissions and is responsible for the system, and the 
people who are being watched by the system; these are shown as principal opposing forces in Figure 1(b). 
In practice, however, normally owners do not operate the video surveillance systems themselves, but 
instead delegate this task to another organization, e.g. a guard company; this organization is referred as 
operator. Similarly, most people are unable to determine whether video surveillance is fair and warranted 
or excessive, so it is typically an elected government which regulates video surveillance through 
legislation and guidelines. This means that, in practice, the video surveillance operator and the 
government become the real opposing forces in a video surveillance system.  
 
People are the core of our model, because they may have certain expectations from each component of the 
video surveillance system, whereas the other entities strive to live up to the expectations of the people. It 
is the combined responsibility of the owner and the operator to ensure the privacy of the people. Privacy 
 of people should be protected both from outside attackers and the personnel within the owner and 
operator organizations. The operator is responsible for performing his duties while being least intrusive as 
far as the privacy of people is concerned. 
 
Based on our model that considers the different components of the video surveillance system, the 
perspective of the stakeholders involved and the conventional privacy requirements, we describe below 
the identified privacy requirements in a video surveillance system.  
 
Consent and Signage: Consent of the people who can potentially be recorded by the video surveillance 
system needs to be taken in advance, either explicitly or implicitly. One way to take consent is by 
informing the people about video surveillance through signage i.e. displaying clear and visible symbols 
in the area where video surveillance takes place 
Anonymity, Data Hiding and Privacy Safeguards: While the system is supposed to monitor the behavior 
of the people, it should strive to maintain the anonymity of the people by hiding their identity using 
certain privacy safeguarding mechanisms. Therefore the system must implement data hiding techniques 
which obfuscate the identity-revealing regions in the images when the operators monitor video streams in 
a normal situation. In order to hide the identity of observed people, identity revealing sensitive areas are 
first determined and then removed or de-identified depending upon the approach used. Several types of 
techniques to hide privacy-sensitive areas have been proposed. A simple technique is to fully remove the 
sensitive regions but this not only hides the identity but in some cases also the behavior (e.g., Criminisi, 
Perez, & Toyama, 2003, 2004; Tang, Ying, Wang, & Ping, 2004). Another type of approach is to reduce the 
level of detail of privacy-sensitive areas, with the help of blurring or pixilation, leaving the subject 
unidentifiable yet the behavior remains recognizable (e.g.,  Schiff, Meingast, Mulligan, Sastry, & Goldberg, 
2009; Saini, Atrey, Mehrotra, & Kankanhalli, 2013; Yu et al. 2008). The third approach, called abstraction, is to 
remove the sensitive regions and replace them with dummy objects such as silhouettes or skeletons. Some 
of the key works in this area are proposed by (Haritaoglu, Harwood, & Davis, 2000; Koshimizu, Toriyama, & 
Babaguchi, 2006; Senior, Pankanti, Hampapur, Brown, Tian, & Ekin, 2003). Yet another technique proposed in 
literature, called scrambling, is to encrypt the sensitive regions with a key allowing the area to be 
decrypted only by authorized personnel possessing the key, see for instance (Boult, 2005; Carrillo et al., 
2008; Dufaux & Ebrahimi, 2006). As compared to other techniques, this approach offers the benefit of 
perfectly reconstructing the original image.  
Video properties: The owner needs to determine whether cameras with advanced functionalities such as 
pan-tilt-zoom, night-vision and high-resolution are really required to be used, with respect to the 
purpose of the surveillance conducted. 
 
Deletion after retention period: Depending upon the regulations of the region where video surveillance 
takes place, the captured data must be automatically deleted as soon as the retention period expires. 
 
Voyeurism protection: In order to restrict voyeurism, advanced functionalities such as searching, 
identifying and tracking an individual are only to be made available when an operator explicitly places 
such a request to the system. While granting these privileges the system logs the request along with the 
information about the circumstances in which such a request is granted.  
Public access to their data: People should be able to get access to the images containing them, through a 
pre-define procedure. Certain countries, for example Canada and France, legally bind the surveillance 
operator to allow individuals to watch their own images captured by the surveillance system.  
  
Figure  2: Taxonomy  of Video Surveillance  System 
 
The points indicated in the model may  not  be applicable altogether in all areas where video surveillance  
takes  place (Margalit, 2008).  Consider example  of an educational institute which typically has several 
areas  such as classrooms,  offices, research labs, cafeteria, lawns, dormitories, etc.  Without question, in 
different areas people have different expectations of privacy,  which must  be taken  into  consideration 
while deploying  video surveillance,  hence the requirements would vary in these areas.  In this context,  
we offer a taxonomy  of video surveillance as a hierarchical structure in Figure 2.  We classify video  
surveillance into  two major  types:  i) Video  surveillance in  publicly  accessible  areas,  and  ii)  Video  
surveillance in private areas.   Publicly  accessible  areas  such  as streets, transport,  shopping malls,  
supermarkets, restaurants, etc.  are  accessible  to  anyone.   On  the  other hand,  private  areas are 
accessible to a limited  number  of people whose identity may  already  be  known.    Video  surveillance 
in  publicly  accessible  areas  can be performed either  by public  authorities (e.g.  law enforcement 
authority) or by  private sector  (e.g.   owner  of a supermarket) and  each  has  to  follow the relevant 
laws.  Video surveillance in private areas  can also be categorized into two subcategories:  i) imposed by 
third  party,  and ii) initiated  themselves.  In the former, the video surveillance is initiated  by a third  
party  with/without consent of the people under  surveillance,  example includes workplace surveillance; 
while in the latter  category,  it is initiated  by the people under surveillance themselves and example 
includes use of video surveillance  in one’s own home. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Many public and private  organizations have provided certain guidelines  regarding deployment and  
maintenance of the  video  surveillance systems.  Some focus only on public sector  and law enforcement 
agencies, e.g, guidelines given by Beech et al. (2006), while others target both  public  and  private 
organizations which are using video surveillance systems, e.g., (Buttarelli, 2010). Whether these 
guidelines are legally binding or not depends on the fact whether they  have  been  provided by a private 
organization or a public  authority,  for example,  there exist certain guidelines in Canada  regarding video 
surveillance which are provided  by the Privacy  Commissioner of Canada and  hence are legally binding.   
Here we combine  the  guidelines  for employing video surveillance, provided by European  Data  
Protection Supervisor (Buttarelli, 2010), Privacy Commissioner of Canada (2008), and Constitution 
Project  (Beech et al., 2006)  – a non-government organization  in USA. These recommendations, albeit  
not guarantee to avoid breach of law, ensure that  the impact  of video surveillance on privacy is 
minimized  and  therefore may  help achieving  the  compliance  with  the  privacy legislation  in a 
particular country. 
 
 
1. Establish a lawful reason for conducting video surveillance  and use video surveillance  
only for that purpose 
 2. Determine  whether  a less privacy-invasive  alternative to video surveillance would 
meet the requirements 
3. Perform the  cost-benefit analysis,   comparing the  alternative means  of addressing  
the stated purpose  of the system 
4. Build privacy into the system design and address data  protection  issues on early stage 
5. Assess the impact  of system  on privacy  and freedom of individuals 
6. Consult the  regulatory authority – if any  – and  other  stakeholders of the  system,   
for  example  employee  representative in  case  of workplace monitoring 
7. Determine  whether  live monitoring  without  recording is enough, otherwise, store the 
recorded images securely and destroy  them after a specified time (one week in most of 
the cases) 
8. Provide  public notices about  the surveillance 
9. Devise a mechanism  to give individuals  access to data  about  them 
10. Create technological and administrative safeguards to reduce the possibility of misuse 
and abuse of the system 
11. Provide  training to the system operators and educate  them  on obligation to protect the 
privacy  of individuals 
12. Maintain  a secure log in order to keep track  of the activities  performed by the system  
operators 
CONCLUSION 
Video surveillance system  is generally considered a powerful  tool for fighting  crime and protect people 
and property from harm. The combined use of video surveillance with a rapid reaction police force, 
extends the reach of the police and allows better policing at a reduced cost. The benefits to security, 
however come at a cost of intrusion of privacy of the citizens that the video surveillance systems are 
installed to protect. Many civil activists consider the installation of video surveillance systems in public 
places in conflict with Article 12 of the United Nation's Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which 
states that "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honor and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of 
the law against such interference or attacks." Moreover, the constant surveillance often results in changed 
behavior and self-censorship by the people being monitored, which touches on important freedom rights, 
such as free speech and the right to assemble. It is therefore important that the deployment of video 
surveillance systems strikes a balance  between  security and  privacy. 
 
The legal and  social implications of video surveillance system are  quite  extensive and it is important 
that the use of video surveillance is both lawful and acceptable in the community where it is deployed.  
Some countries have specific laws and regulations that govern the use of video surveillance, but in many 
cases such laws have to be weighed against fundamental right and there has to be proportionality between  
the loss of privacy and the threats that the system is installed to prevent. In  order  to  avoid  breaking the 
law of the territory where  the video surveillance system is installed,  a thorough  study must be  
carried out to identify all the legal requirements for video surveillance and seeking advice from legal 
experts is generally recommended. When deploying a video surveillance system, the system must  
be built  in a way that considers the legal requirements identified in this study and mechanisms to detect 
misuse  or abuse  of the system should be built right into  the  system design.   Moreover,  the  
people operating the system must  be provided  adequate training and they should be educated 
 about  privacy  issues. This training and education should be accompanied by some form of non-
disclosure agreement which must prohibit the propagation of anything learned from the video 
surveillance system to unauthorized outsiders, similar to the secrecy of correspondence. Finally,  an 
independent regulatory authority could play a vital role in making these systems trustworthy by the  
people and minimizing  the big brother feelings in a society where video surveillance is used.  
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KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 
 
Video Monitoring: The act of visually observing a place or the activities of people 
 
Information Security: Protection of information against unauthorized access 
 
Regulation: An order, rule or law prescribed by an authority 
 
Data Retention: A collection of stored data 
 
Data Protection: Safeguarding mechanism to protect the stored data 
 
Encryption: The act of scrambling data which can be unscrambled only if a required piece of information 
is available 
 
Communication Interception: Stealthily monitoring the data when it is in transit from one point to 
another 
 
Regulatory Body: Authority that supervises data protection practices 
